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Chapter Five 
The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue 
Alex Madva 
What should we do to overcome epistemic injustice?1 Miranda Fricker 
(2007, 2010b) argues that we as individuals ought to cultivate certain testi-
monial and interpretive virtues. This chapter defends and expands upon her 
proposals. My background motivation is to respond to two prominent objec-
tions to Fricker's virtue-theoretic proposals. First, the situationist objection 
states that her account of virtue cultivation is empirically implausible, suffer-
ing both from the general limitations that (situationists argue) plague all 
ethical and epistemological virtue theory, as well as from more particular 
pitfalls facing individuals who try to overcome their own "bias blind spots" 
(e.g., Alfano 2015, Davidson and Kelly 2015, Sherman 2015). Second, and 
relatedly, the structuralist objection argues that Fricker's prescriptions for 
cultivating epistemic virtue are excessively individualistic, and fail to appre-
ciate the underlying structural factors driving epistemic oppression (Alcoff 
2010, Anderson 2012, Ayala-Lopez 2018, Dotson 2012, Langton 2010, Me-
dina 2013, Washington 2016). 
I say these challenges represent the background motivations for this chap-
ter because I won't have the space to respond to them in depth. They have, in 
more general terms, been litigated extensively elsewhere (e.g., Fairweather 
and Alfano 2017). Instead, the brunt of this chapter will be dedicated to 
making the positive case that Fricker's account is both empirically oriented 
and plausible—indeed, pursuing epistemic virtue in roughly the way she 
1. The inception and early development of this chapter owe an immeasurable debt to Jenni-
fer Kanyuk. Jen and I originally intended to write this together, until scheduling conflicts made 
that impossible. I am also grateful for insightful, rigorous, and patient feedback from Stacey 
Goguen and Benjamin Sherman, as well as for the audience's questions and suggestions during 
a poster presentation of this material at the Bias in Context #4 conference at the University of 
Utah in October 2017. 
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describes is inevitable for anyone who takes seriously the systemic epistemic 
injustices she and others have identified. According to Fricker (and numer-
ous feminist-epistemological forerunners and commentators), the pivot away 
from epistemic injustice depends in part on moments of self-critical aware-
ness, states of cognitive dissonance in which an individual realizes that she 
may, for example, be underestimating an interlocutor's credibility due to 
stereotypes or prejudices. Fricker further advocates that individuals cultivate 
epistemic habits that aim to consistently neutralize the effects of such preju-
dices on their credibility estimates. I agree on both counts: working to culti-
vate such habits is an integral component of what we ought to do in the face 
of pervasive epistemic injustice. I sample from a range of findings from 
social and cognitive psychology that bear these claims out. That said, Fricker 
is clear that her specific proposals do not constitute the only means through 
which individuals and institutions should combat epistemic injustice. I there-
fore build on her account—drawing inspiration from several essays written 
after Epistemic Injustice (Fricker 2010b, 2010a, 2012, 2013)—by beginning 
to sketch a fuller, antiindividualistic picture of the structure of cultivating 
individual epistemic virtue(s). 
OBJECTIONS TO EPISTEMIC-JUSTICE VIRTUE THEORY 
Structuralists and situationists share much in common. Both claim that 
what's outside individual hearts and minds is more important than what's in 
them (i.e., more important than individuals' idiosyncratic beliefs, desires, 
prejudices, and traits) when it comes to the main drivers of human behavior, 
and therefore to the perpetuation and eradication of epistemic injustice, from 
which it would seem to follow that philosophical and activist attention to 
individual vices and virtues is misplaced. Structuralists and situationists will, 
for example, both emphasize the power of social roles to shape behavior over 
and above idiosyncratic character traits ("it's not that I have an authoritarian 
or evil personality, or that I harbor ill will toward members of such-and-such 
group . . . I was just following orders"). The difference between these objec-
tions is that situationists typically focus on normatively irrelevant or inap-
propriate influences on behavior, as when judges deny parole applications 
because it's close to lunch and they're hungry (Danziger, Levav, and Av-
naim-Pesso 2011), whereas structuralists often focus on prima facie norma-
tively appropriate influences on human behavior. For example, Saray Ayala-
Lopez (2018) argues that many instances of testimonial injustice are less a 
matter of individuals harboring prejudices against speakers, and more about 
individuals simply following publicly shared norms. Very roughly, her argu-
ment locates the problem in the unfair "rules of the game" rather than in the 
irrationality, ignorance, or self-interest of the "players." Structuralists also 
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point to still broader societal and environmental factors like group-based 
segregation, wealth inequality, education-funding streams, environmental 
toxins, and so on, to explain the perpetuation of systemic epistemic injus-
tices. 
Situationists and structuralists have identified a range of incredibly im-
portant phenomena. I disagree profoundly with the lessons they draw 
(Brownstein, Madva, and Gawronski under review; Madva forthcoming, 
2016b, 2016a, 2017; Madva and Brownstein 2018). I cannot here catalogue 
all my grievances, and I will rest my response to their claims primarily on the 
conceptual distinctions and empirical evidence I highlight in the following 
sections. In order to provide some context for those claims, however, I home 
in on some of Benjamin Sherman's (2015) arguments against the wisdom or 
feasibility of Fricker's recommendations for taking meaningful steps to be-
come more epistemically just. Recall that Fricker argues for the necessity of 
self-critical awareness, moments of cognitive dissonance in which an indi-
vidual considers that his assessments of others' credibility might be biased. 
She writes, "the initial step towards improved, less prejudiced forms of social 
perception can only be a step of critical reflection . . . the initial moves 
towards finding ways to neutralize the impact of prejudice in our judgements 
have to be self-reflective in the first instance" (Fricker 2010b, 166). Fricker 
argues, furthermore, that individuals should practice trying to neutralize the 
effects of prejudice on their credibility judgments. 
Sherman is dubious about these proposals. First, he argues that when 
individuals step back and critically reflect on their intuitive credibility judg-
ments, they will most likely find their initial impressions to be accurate. 
(Sherman is, of course, not skeptical of critical reflection's general value, but 
of its specific relevance to catching and correcting our own errors in assign-
ing credibility to other speakers, through the specific methods recommended 
by Fricker.) For example, research on the "bias blind spot" suggests we tend 
to think our judgments are more objective than they really are (Pronin, Lin, 
and Ross 2002). As a result, Sherman writes (citing Moore's Paradox), "your 
own present judgments will always seem correct to you" (2015, 11). Sher-
man predicts not just that Fricker-style self-critical awareness is unlikely to 
ameliorate testimonial injustice, but that it is more likely to reentrench our 
biased assessments than to undermine them. 
I will eventually argue in section 3 that Sherman's predictions about what 
"always" happens are belied by the empirical evidence. It bears noting, how-
ever, that Fricker nowhere purports to offer an easy, fail-safe debiasing pro- 
cedure. Like most moments of cognitive dissonance, reflection on our poten-
tially biased epistemic habits and judgments can be resolved in variously 
vicious or virtuous ways, or simply ignored altogether. The point is instead 
that such moments of self-critical reflection must happen if progress is to be 
made. I agree. The rarity, difficulty, and potential backfiring effects of these 
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self-critical moments represent just one important set of considerations; the 
further question is whether there is any viable alternative. Are we seriously 
to consider that progress toward the social-epistemic overhauls advocated by 
situationists and structuralists is possible without a whole bunch of currently 
complicit citizens of liberal democracies coming to reconsider the correct-
ness of their epistemic judgments and then taking steps to do something 
about it? Can, for example, enduring racial epistemic justice be achieved 
without a critical mass of white Americans reassessing their skeptical im-
pressions of the credibility of people of color who testify to, and protest 
against, ongoing oppression? 
Even if we grant that moments of self-critical awareness have an unavoid-
able role to play in spurring resistance against epistemic injustice, a further 
set of questions regards the form that resistance should take. Following other 
situationists and structuralists, Sherman is skeptical that our efforts should be 
invested in aiming for virtue. He doubts there is any such attainable ideal as 
individual epistemic justice and suggests that striving for such an impossible 
goal might be counterproductive or even incoherent. There will, he suspects, 
be better ways of reducing testimonial injustice than for each individual to 
try compensating for the role of prejudice in their epistemic assessments. 
Some of his concerns here are weightier than others. It is perhaps humanly 
impossible to shoot 100 percent from the free-throw line, or to accurately 
answer every trivia question on every episode of Jeopardy!, but people can 
practice sinking as many shots and answering as many questions as they can. 
Similarly, there's clearly room to want to be, and practice being, as accurate 
in our testimonial uptake as we can. We have all had experiences of thinking 
someone was lying or misremembering only to discover they were telling the 
truth (it turns out we were misremembering!), or observing a disagreement 
about some trivial factual issue (like directions or opening hours) and being 
persuaded by the uber-confident, outspoken, cis able-bodied white man when 
it turns out that a less socially privileged person was right all along. We (can) 
learn from such mistakes and (should) try to do better next time. We do not 
always get feedback about the accuracy of our initial credibility estimates, 
but we get plenty, and we can be more or less diligent about absorbing it and 
trying to do better. 
Now, is there such a thing as full-blown testimonial virtue, where this 
refers to an actually existing earthling mammal whose responses to testimony 
are perfectly accurate and just? Presumably not. Although I take it to be 
obvious that most individuals cannot achieve perfect moral-epistemic virtue, 
many individuals can (and therefore should try to) get much closer to the 
ideals than they already are. I tend to focus on the cultivation of these virtues 
rather than the virtues themselves, because I follow nonideal theorists and 
responsibilists like Lorraine Code and Fricker in asserting that we can take 
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steps in the right direction(s) despite failing to settle with full precision what 
the fmal destination is or having a detailed map for how to get there: 
epistemic responsibility does not come complete with a set of accompanying 
rules for the direction of the mind. Like many virtues, it names a precept, a 
principle, whose effects are diffuse, unpredictable, and open to ongoing, col-
laborative-contestatory deliberation. Often they do not speak for themselves 
but require collective processes of evaluation/negotiation. I do not spell out 
necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving epistemic responsibility, and 
for good reasons: there are none. But guidelines can be sketched: impressionis-
tic though they may be. (Code 2017, 96) 
The implausibility of context-general codification is itself a central motiva-
tion for a virtue-theoretic rather than rule-based approach (Fricker 2007, 
73-76, and 171-73). (Some readings of Fricker as making unduly narrow 
proposals for combating epistemic injustice may fail to take seriously her 
emphasis on uncodifiability.) I also follow the many feminist epistemologists 
who take for granted that avoiding the perpetuation of epistemic oppression 
and the attainment of full epistemic virtue is extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible (Dotson 2012, 24-25; Medina 2013, sec. 5.2), and yet who for precisely 
this reason insist on being as vigilant as possible in advancing justice and 
knowledge. The process of getting better is ongoing. We know enough now 
to make meaningful improvements. We will learn more as we go, revising 
our current sense of "best practices" in light of continued empirical investiga-
tion and collective-contestatory deliberation. 
Epistemic-virtue cultivation is necessary but not sufficient for social 
change. Fricker writes, for example, that "virtuous individuals working with-
in an institutional body are obviously only part of the story" (2012, 296), 
because "combating epistemic injustice clearly calls for virtues of epistemic 
justice to be possessed by institutions as well as by individuals" (Fricker, 
2007, 176). Such caveats would almost seem to go without saying (hence the 
terms "obviously" and "clearly" in these passages), yet many structuralists 
seem to attribute to Fricker the implausible claim that individual virtue is 
sufficient. 
One reason epistemic-virtue cultivation is insufficient is that it must be 
socially and institutionally embedded. The requisite moments of self-reflec-
tion are unlikely to burst forth ex nihilo from a social vacuum. Someone else 
(a parent, teacher, friend, politician), or at least some event external to your 
own mind (e.g., a person who is profoundly skeptical about the reality of 
police brutality until he personally suffers or witnesses it), likely must con-
front you with at least a smidgen of counterevidence (or epistemic friction) to 
set the relevant self-reflection in motion. For how this kind of prompting 
might go in practice, see David Broockman and Joshua Kalla's (2016) study 
of door-to-door canvassing reducing voters' transphobia for at least three 
90 	 Alex Madva 
months.2 Note that it follows from the necessary embeddedness of virtue 
cultivation that Fricker's occasional talk of self-critical reflection coming 
"first" is a mistake. Various interpersonal, situational, and structural condi-
tions are at least conducive (and perhaps necessary) for enabling the relevant 
self-reflection. This point is implicitly baked into several of Fricker's exam-
ples of individuals raised in thoroughly hierarchical and prejudiced societies 
(2007, sec. 4.2; see also 2012, 2013). (Jose Medina [2013, 18] also some-
times slips into saying that epistemic resistance "has to begin within our-
selves," although he elsewhere emphasizes all manner of social precondi-
tions that perforce precede such introspective first steps.) The upshot is that 
movements toward individual and institutional virtues are interdependent. 
Neither comes first; neither comes second. They are irredeemably entangled 
in a complex set of holistic interrelations. 
So although I agree with more or less all of Fricker's necessary condi-
tions, there is, as she says, more to the story. To better capture the interde-
pendence of individual and structural change, and to thereby do some justice 
to the spirit, if not the letter, of situationists' and structuralists' concerns, I 
propose augmenting our account of epistemic virtue. 
STRUCTURING VIRTUE CULTIVATION 
I highlight here two underappreciated distinctions for cultivating epistemic 
virtue. The first involves the cognitive architecture of the virtues themselves. 
The second involves what we might call the targets of virtuous attention, that 
is, what good epistemic agents think about and react to. 
First, epistemic-virtue cultivation must occur along (at least) two psycho-
logical levels (or "systems"). Discussions of epistemic virtue have focused 
on our self-reflective, corrective, metacognitive dispositions, such as the sec-
ond-order ability (presumably necessary for open-mindedness and humility) 
to recognize when our first-order epistemic intuitions might be in error. This 
emphasis on metacognition is premised on the assumption that our first-
order, intuitive cognitive tendencies are very stubborn, if not altogether in-
corrigible (e.g., Alfano 2013, 147; Kahneman 2011, 417; cf. Madva 2016b, 
2017), perhaps because these tendencies are hardwired from birth, or perhaps 
because these tendencies reflect learned prejudices and other habits of 
thought too deeply ingrained and socially reinforced for individuals to 
change. Either way, the stubbornness assumption is wrong. Epistemic-virtue 
cultivation can and must incorporate the direct retraining of our relatively 
spontaneous, unreflective ("System-1") patterns of thinking, feeling, perceiv-
ing, and reacting to epistemic social reality (Alcoff 2006). I should note there 
will likely be more finely grained or alternative-but-useful ways of slicing 
2. For illuminating examples of how these conversations went, see Resnick (2016). 
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virtue's cognitive-architectural pie. It might, for example, be important to 
demarcate the cognitive, affective, and motivational dimensions of virtue 
(although I tend to be skeptical of distinctions between "reason" and "pas-
sion"; Madva and Brownstein, 2018). 
The second distinction regards the targets of virtuous attention. Fricker's 
original treatment of epistemic virtue focuses primarily on becoming a better 
epistemic agent in local interactions, in the form of reliably and responsibly 
evaluating and interpreting others' testimony. This interactional dimension 
of epistemic virtue is certainly crucial. Here the conceptual and empirical 
questions are: what is the cognitive architecture of an epistemically debiased 
mind and which strategies promote it? However, the cultivation of epistemic 
virtue must have a multidirectional orientation, such that our attention is 
directed not only to the credibility and intelligibility of other individuals but 
also, more broadly, to the structures and institutions in which we are all 
embedded. Before I explain why, note that Fricker's account of testimonial 
justice is not comprehensive even as an account of interactional virtue. Con-
sider, as an extreme example, a person who reliably self-corrects his deflated 
estimates of oppressed speakers' credibility, such that his assessments of 
testimony are perfectly accurate (thereby meeting Fricker's central criterion 
for testimonial justice); yet he then turns around and intentionally tells every-
one else that these oppressed speakers are less credible than he knows them 
to be. It would be absurd to suggest that this person was testimonially virtu-
ous. The wrongs done in this case are not merely moral but epistemic: he is 
degrading others' knowledge, he is failing to respect the oppressed speakers' 
status as knowers and others' status as acquirers of knowledge, and so on. 
Interactional epistemic virtue is, then, as much about telling truths as about 
believing them. So meeting Fricker's criterion is necessary but not sufficient 
for local-interactional testimonial virtue. In this vein, Jason Kawall (2002) 
points out that virtue epistemologists have been preoccupied with individual-
istic, self-regarding epistemic virtues (the personal acquisition of truth and 
avoidance of error via, e.g., open-mindedness or humility) and not enough 
with other-regarding epistemic virtues (e.g., the dissemination of truth via, 
say, honesty or courage). Kawall convincingly argues that certain other-
regarding dispositions are full-blooded components of epistemic virtue. 
We must take this insight further, such that structure-facing dispositions 
claim an equal place in the pantheon of epistemic virtues. Take, for example, 
a member of Congress who voted to forbid the Center for Disease Control 
from even studying the effects of gun violence, or climate scientists who 
know full well the harm we are doing to the planet but accept money from 
private industry to spread lies, fund bogus studies, sow doubt, and so on. 
Again, it would be absurd to suggest that such individuals who know the 
facts, or know how to acquire them, but take steps to prevent our community 
from doing so, are epistemically virtuous. Epistemic virtue requires being the 
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sort of person who reliably and responsibly supports institutions that gener-
ate, disseminate, and retain knowledge. This involves taking steps to promote 
(or, minimally, not taking steps to impede) the creation, revision, or mainte-
nance of just bodies of knowledge. It also requires attention to the ways that 
individuals' social locations and situations inform their beliefs and other 
epistemic dispositions (e.g., Ayala-Lopez and Vasilyeva, this volume; Grass-
wick 2017). Here the conceptual and empirical questions are: what is the 
cognitive architecture of an epistemically resistant mind and which strategies 
promote it? 
Cultivating epistemic virtue thus requires a multidirectional orientation, 
targeting both micro-interactions and macro-structures. Again, there are sure-
ly more fine-grained and illuminating ways to parse the objects of virtuous 
attention, as well as other objects of virtuous attention beyond these two 
(consider, e.g., nonsocial truths and other epistemic goods, such as scientists 
who must be conscientious in the management of their data). But the forego-
ing distinction represents a useful first pass for my purposes. Whether inter-
actional and structure-facing epistemic virtues are "unified" in the Socratic 
sense is also an important question. Can a person move closer to interactional 
virtue without approaching structure-facing virtue, and vice versa? These are 
essentially empirical matters, not to be adjudicated via armchair analysis. I'll 
next underscore evidence of overlap between interactional and structure-
facing virtue, but it is presumably possible for them to come apart, or work 
cross purposes. In the nonepistemic realm, someone can be compassionate 
and respectful in their micro-interactions but remain politically oblivious, 
indifferent, or even deeply committed to the perpetuation of unjust institu-
tions. Similar disconnects may arise in the epistemic domain. 
Let me also stress that the virtues are highly contextual and open-tex-
tured, and that epistemic-virtue cultivation must be tailored to specific em-
bodied minds occupying specific social locations operating in specific politi-
cal conditions. For one very crude example, perhaps those who occupy privi-
leged positions typically ought to focus more on cultivating epistemic humil-
ity while those who occupy oppressed positions might be more warranted in 
seeking out strategies for cultivating more epistemic confidence or self-re-
spect. Processes of virtue cultivation must be indexed to individuals' antece-
dent personality dispositions, social locations, and so forth, which will inevi-
tably complicate our guidelines and taxonomies. Does acknowledging com-
plexity leave room to say anything systematic and general about epistemic-
virtue cultivation? Yes, but, as Kristie Dotson emphasizes, only so long as 
we "move toward open conceptual structures that signify without absolute 
foreclosure so as to reduce the continued propagation of epistemic oppres-
sion" (2012, 25). What follows is a proof of concept that meaningful steps 
toward epistemic virtue can be taken. These are some of the things that some 
individuals can (should) do to cultivate epistemic virtue. 
The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue 	 93 
EVIDENCE 
First, consider a way to retrain our automatic, interactional dispositions, via 
what Fricker might call an "unreflective psychological work-out" (2010b, 
165-66). The ultimate attribution error refers to the tendency for individuals 
to interpret undesirable behaviors performed by outgroup members in terms 
of dispositional traits stereotypical of the outgroup, but to interpret their 
positive behaviors in terms of situational factors. This social-explanatory 
bias has clear implications for epistemic injustice. Take Herbert dismissing 
Marge's testimony on the grounds that "there's female intuition, and then 
there are the facts" (Pricker 2007, 9). Part of what paves the way for this 
credibility deficit is Herbert wrongly attributing Marge's anger and frustra-
tion, which are actually justified, to the stereotypical-dispositional trait of the 
"hysterical" woman (2007, 88), easily overrun by feelings Evidence sug-
gests that both men and women are more likely to interpret women's anger in 
terms of dispositional traits (e.g., "She must be an emotional person") rather 
than situations (e.g., "She is justifiably angry given the circumstances"), and, 
as a result, to perceive angry women as less knowledgeable and lower in 
social status than angry men (Brescoll and Uhlmann 2008). Such attribution 
errors clearly contribute to epistemic injustice. 
However, targeted practice can reduce this automatic bias (Stewart, Lau, 
Kawakami, and Myers 2010; see also Levontin, Halperin, and Dweck 
2013).3 During Situational Attribution Training, participants are shown 
many examples of behaviors, for which they must select potential explana-
tions. For example, a photo of a black man's face might be paired with the 
behavioral description, "Arrived at work an hour late," and participants must 
then choose between two potential explanations, "The power went out and 
reset his alarm," or "He is a particularly irresponsible person" (Stewart, Latu, 
Kawakami, and Myers 2010, 223). This training reshaped some of partici-
pants' epistemic dispositions, by increasing the automatic cognitive access-
ibility of situational explanations and decreasing the accessibility of disposi-
tional ones. What's more, the training reduced the overall cognitive access-
ibility of racial stereotypes. This latter evidence, of a close psychological 
connection between individuals' epistemic-explanatory dispositions and their 
implicit stereotypes, supports Fricker's contention that social bias is deeply 
tied to credibility deficits and other epistemic injustices. Studies like this also 
exemplify how part of what it is to be epistemically virtuous is to be attuned 
to the powerful role of situations in explaining behavior. Becoming more 
epistemically virtuous, even in micro-interactional contexts, involves an es- 
3. One would like to see these studies replicated with larger samples. I cite more recent and 
high-powered evidence for epistemic-debiasing techniques in what follows. See Madva (2017) 
for a qualitative survey and philosophical defense of similar debiasing procedures. See also 
Ayala-Lopez and Vasilyeva (this volume). 
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sentially situation-facing dimension, that is, better understanding testifiers' 
contexts and social locations. (Such findings also illustrate how situationist 
objections against epistemic virtue risk being self-defeating, by demonstrat-
ing one way in which awareness of situational influence must be built in to 
what individual virtue requires.) 
Situational Attribution Training admittedly sounds simplistic and heavy-
handed, but one can easily imagine more sophisticated, "gamified" analogues 
involving riddles or puzzles, perhaps modeled on games like Clue,4 as well 
as straightforward ways for us to practice these strategies in daily life (e.g., 
"Whenever I get frustrated with a student, I will try to think of three situa-
tional explanations!"). Although critics of epistemic virtue (largely under the 
influence of Daniel Kahneman) have emphasized the stubbornness of our 
epistemic dispositions, a growing literature demonstrates that targeted, gam-
ified training significantly reduces such notorious cognitive tendencies as the 
confirmation bias, the "bias blind spot," and the "anchoring" and "represen-
tativeness" heuristics in durable and domain-general ways (Dunbar et al. 
2014, Morewedge et al. 2015). Pervasive pessimism about individual change 
has been premature. At present we have basically no idea just how flexible 
these dispositions are. 
Nevertheless, there will presumably be some limits to how far unreflec-
tive psychological workouts can take us, and there will accordingly remain 
an ineliminable role for more self-corrective epistemic virtues. Margot Mon-
teith's (1993) "Self-Regulation of Prejudice" model, cited by Fricker (2010b, 
165; see also Saul 2017), offers a helpful framework for sketching the gener-
al structure of metacognitive virtues. On this model, individuals with the 
virtuous commitment to be unprejudiced can form the habit of attending to 
their own spontaneous prejudiced thoughts and impulses, feeling guilty in 
response, and then doubling down on their motivation to do better. For exam-
ple, calling these individuals' attention to the discrepancies between their 
antiprejudiced commitments and their actual dispositions makes them less 
likely to draw stereotypical inferences or find racist jokes funny (Burns, 
Monteith, and Parker 2017). Importantly, these and other findings highlight 
that the automatic activation of stereotypes does not guarantee that the 
stereotypes will be applied in our considered judgments. To the contrary, 
metacognitive virtue (partly) involves reliably interpreting one's impulsively 
biased thoughts and feelings as signals that this is an opportunity to be just 
(Madva, forthcoming). Skepticism about the prospects of introspective self-
correction has been overblown. It is simply not true that our present judg-
ments will always strike us as correct. To the contrary, many individuals 
regularly experience palpable cognitive dissonance between their reflective 
4. Compare the games available on tiltfactor.org. 
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commitments and their unreflectively biased judgments and feelings (David-
son and Kelly 2015; Gawronski et al. 2008). 
Another empirically well-supported example of metacognitive epistemic 
virtue is perspective-taking. Fricker, Medina, and others rightly emphasize 
that the imaginative occupation of others' points of view can reduce testimo-
nial and hermeneutic injustice. Fricker cites, for example, Simone Weil's 
claim that "Unless one has placed oneself on the side of the oppressed, to feel 
with them, one cannot understand" (Fricker 2012, 287, Weil 1978, 139). 
Consider in this vein a preregistered study that tested the effects of a twenty-
minute, online "choose-your-own-adventure" game, in which Hungarians in 
their mid-twenties occupied the perspective of an individual in the Hungarian 
Roma minority (Simonovits, Kezdi, and Kardos 2018). Both immediately 
after the game and at least one month later, participants reported much less 
anti-Roma prejudice, as well as less prejudice toward another social group 
(refugees) who were not mentioned in the game. Participants were even 10 
percent less likely to intend to vote for Hungary's far-right white-supremacist 
party. While this particular study did not directly test, say, participants' inter-
pretations of or belief in Roma testimony, the epistemic implications of 
perspective-taking are clear. The whole point is to better know and under-
stand others' views. Thus mock jurors encouraged to adopt the perspective of 
defendants become less likely to find them guilty (Skorinko et al. 2014). And 
although perspective-taking is intuitively more at home in interactional con-
texts (when one person imagines the perspective of another), it also has clear 
structure-facing implications. For example, adolescents with perspective-tak-
ing personalities are less punitive and more supportive of restorative justice, 
agreeing with such statements (about the testimonial structure of the criminal 
justice system) as, "I believe that victims' voices should be heard as part of 
the justice process" (Rasmussen et al. 2018, 73). Moreover, although being 
disposed to take others' perspectives (at the right times in the right way) is an 
individual-level virtue, there is much that institutions should do to promote 
it, principally by bringing members of different groups together under terms 
of cooperation and social equality (Anderson 2012; Galinsky et al. 2015). It 
should come as no surprise that racially diverse juries are both more likely 
than homogeneous juries to consider an array of perspectives and to more 
accurately recall case facts and testimony (Sommers 2006). 
What about the structure-facing virtues and vices? One of the most perni-
cious psychological dispositions propping up unjust structures is a kind of 
default tendency to assume that the status quo is just (Jost 2015). This sug-
gests that debiasing procedures should be oriented toward shifting our de-
faults, such that our operating assumption is that the status quo is not fair, 
and that things can and must be done to change it. A key set of structure-
facing dispositions therefore revolves around seeing structural change as 
desirable and believing that agents and groups have the power to bring the 
96 	 Alex Madva 
requisite changes about (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2011; Johnson 
and Kentaro 2012; Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, and Denney 2010; van Zom-
eren 2013). 
Which psychological and structural factors make individuals more likely 
to adopt these structure-facing virtues? Many of the answers are relatively 
unsurprising. Individuals are more likely to participate in collective action 
against unjust systems when, for example, they strongly identify with an 
oppressed group, swiftly and reliably get angry in response to injustices done 
to that group, and hold a firm conviction in the difference-making power of 
their participation in collective action. I want to conclude, however, with 
some perhaps less predictable dispositions that conduce to structure-facing 
virtue—and that wear their epistemic relevance on their sleeves. Evidence 
suggests that individuals are more apt to see injustice for what it is, and 
collectively protest against it, precisely when they are more willing and able 
to question their epistemic and political intuitions (cf., open-mindedness and 
humility), to practice and take pleasure in engaging difficulty cognitive activ-
ity (cf., curiosity and diligence), and to be relatively untroubled when they 
see the world differently from those around them (cf., a critical openness to 
interpersonal epistemic friction). In short, structure-facing epistemic virtue 
requires resistance to "certainty, security, and conformity" (Jost 2015, 623). 
By contrast, individuals will more likely rush to judging that the status quo is 
fair, and even protest to preserve inegalitarian institutions, if they feel a 
strong need to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity, prefer not to think long and 
hard about difficult questions, and strongly desire to share an epistemic real-
ity with their proximate peers. This conformist need for shared belief is 
particularly salient for situationist and structuralist criticisms of epistemic 
virtue and individual agency. Situationists have, since the earliest high-pro-
file social-psychological experiments on conformity, obedience, and inter-
group conflict, portrayed shared reality as a virtually inevitable byproduct of 
plunking human cognitive systems into certain social contexts (i.e., contexts 
marked by hierarchical power relations and group-competitive dynamics). 
Shared reality bias also features in Elizabeth Anderson's (2012) structuralist 
criticism of individual virtue cultivation. She treats the impulse toward 
shared reality as one of a handful of universal and powerful biases, such that 
everyone's views tend to converge simply by virtue of sharing social space. 
But while it is certainly true that structures can be designed to either promote 
or counteract in-group consensus and conformity, matters are much more 
complex. One dimension of this complexity is that the need for shared reality 
varies between individuals, making it a fruitful site for individual-level inter-
vention. Other things equal (making allowances for variations in social posi-
tion), seeking out a soundproof echo chamber is an epistemic vice, whereas 
openness to epistemic friction is a virtue. 
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I feel compelled to note that, while the empirical evidence for the value of 
interventions like perspective-taking is robust, many of these interventions 
are continuous with thoroughly commonsensical pieces of folk wisdom, and 
with claims that social justice theorists of many stripes have long defended. 
Although we should continue seeking out new methods and remain open to 
new discoveries about how best to become better, we should not falsely 
portray these strategies as radically novel, inaccessible to laypeople, or fun-
damentally unknowable sans academic research. 
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